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I. INTRODUCTION
{1} This paper [1] reviews recent attempts to extend traditional property rights and other information controls
and regulations into new media, such as cyberspace, primarily the World Wide Web. It reviews developments
in copyright, trademark, trademark dilution, misappropriation, trespass, censorship, tort, privacy and other
legal doctrines as they are reflected in recent United States case law and legislation, and to a lesser extent, in
international agreements. Legal problems often arise because there is a conflict of viewpoints in how to best
characterize space on the Internet, specifically the World Wide Web. Some argue that traditional ownership
rights should apply, or perhaps a model of limited property rights, which assumes an implied license to
"trespass" or move within that space, e.g., to visit or to link to another website. Others believe that private
ordering systems, like contract law, should dominate the negotiation of information boundaries. Still, others
see the Internet as the "last open frontier," or at least, as the "last green space" or "commons." This debate is
assessed in light of several implications for information in the new millennium, i.e.,the post-national era, as it
is naive to assume that simply because borders may dissolve or boundaries may expand through technology,
that information access and equity will also naturally increase.
{2} Initially, definitions of several terms, such as harmonization, globalization, and a suggested alternative,
amelioration, are offered not to portray an information Armageddon, but to point out the dangerous potential
of new trends in information ownership and control. A significant portion of the discussion herein reviews
recent legal developments in information ownership and control, and characterizes these developments into
several themes: iteration, redaction, reaction, and marginalization. Examples of iteration demonstrate that
traditional information boundaries are breaking down. In its place, redaction occurs as new concepts of
information ownership and control succeed. In reaction to this, many sovereign states and entities are
adopting self-protection measures to protect their information resources. Finally, marginalization occurs when
alternative concepts of information access and control are discounted in the name of universal progress, and
so the interests of many information users become outcast or otherwise ignored.
{3} The article concludes with a review of several myths that are often forwarded in the debate against those
who attempt to regulate, through law, conduct in cyberspace. The myths are not so much rebutted with
alternative maxims, but questioned in the hopes of forwarding an understanding of why these legal
controversies have developed, and will continue to develop in cyberspace, as well as their impact upon world
citizens in the post-national era. The first myth is a general statement that conduct and content cannot be
regulated on the Internet through law because the Internet is an open system, with no boundaries, and thus,
laws cannot practically apply. Another myth is that the best characterization of the Internet is that of "last
frontier." Taken to its extreme, this position advocates a certain "information vigilantism." Perhaps less overt,
but pernicious nonetheless, is the increase in the number of advocates for self-normative regulation of the
Internet. In reality, this option envisions a series of private rights as the dominant mode of information access
vis-à-vis the freedom to contract. The concept of the Internet as the new "green space," akin to a virtual
commons is critiqued. In contrast, the reality of recent World Wide Web litigation suggests that legal
institutions are adopting existing concepts and nomenclature to the information problems of virtual spaces,
i.e., "cybertort" and "cyber squatter." For better or worse, the law is adapting the legal ordering of its
ownership and control schemes to cyberspace and the "fencing" of boundaries in cyberspace continues.
A. Harmonization
{4} The first concept, harmonization, is a familiar one. Harmonization is a term used most often to describe
the process of conforming national laws to some basic international standard. An example is the impact of the
recent WIPO ("World Intellectual Property Organization") treaties. [2] These treaties were negotiated to
protect copyrighted material in digital environments and to provide stronger international protection to
performers and producers of sound recordings. In the United States, these developments resulted in the recent
passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. [3] Harmonization is a mechanism of fairness, as it
ensures that similar acts in different places (i.e.,signatory countries) will produce similar results. In the case
of the copyright example, it means that a work will be protected in all countries that agree to abide by the
terms of the treaty. [4] Harmonization is also efficient, in that it eliminates the transaction cost of negotiating
agreements between information sellers and information buyers in every location where, in the case of
copyright for example, the work would be available for sale. In this manner, harmonization also facilitates
access, as some producers may be reluctant to offer their information products and services to the citizens of
particular countries where such protections are not in place.
{5} Harmonization relates to the information infrastructure under which such a country may be forced to
operate. It is in this way, that harmonization exhibits its more detrimental side. Harmonization is in essence a
lowest common denominator approach to information access and control. It is characterized by the
internalization of external standards. While this may not be negative in and of itself, questions of equity arise
when the decision-makers, or those who set the external standards are primarily First World countries, who
are considered the "information rich" and the decision-takers (i.e.,Third World countries), known as the
"information poor" are not. It should also be observed that this disparity could, of course, exist within the
borders of a sovereign state as well. Problems can also arise within a particular country when the national or
commercial interests of a segment of the population supercede the collective access rights of its citizens. An
example of this is occurring with the attempts to harmonize United States law with the European Community
Data Protection Directive 96/9/EC, [5] which was enacted in March 1996 to protect online and real time
databases throughout Europe. [6]
{6} As a result, successive congresses have attempted to pass a similar protective law for databases in the
United States. [7] If the legislation is passed, the ability for subsequent users to incorporate portions of pre-
existing databases will lessen, even when the content of the database would otherwise be in the public
domain (i.e.,it is factual or otherwise contains uncopyrightable material). This creates a new sui generis
protection for basic information beyond the existing copyright and misappropriation law. [8] Instead of
protecting originality, the bill, if enacted, would protect an information owner's investment in organizing,
assembling, and maintaining information, and in essence, reverses the decision of the United States Supreme
Court. [9] This is figuratively known as the owner's "sweat of the brow." By its design, the bill rewards the
economies of scale that existing information owners and developers draw upon. [10] This may work to stifle
competition from start-up and smaller existing companies and it will ultimately make information less
available, as it subjects the information to stronger protection regimes and makes new database development
more costly for new entrants. In addition, the "fair use" provisions for schools, libraries and other non-profit
enterprises contained in one of the proposed pieces of legislation are inadequate. [11]
{7} Finally, harmonization, as applied in past scenarios ignores the individual uniqueness of certain markets
in the name of inter-operability. In this manner, harmonization can be said to offer a debasement of
information concepts or integrity. A country may, within its boundaries, have indigenous property systems
that are communal in nature or based upon some other concepts that stand in opposition to copyright. In order
to attract foreign investment that country may agree to harmonize its own laws according to the developing
international order. [12] As a result, the country may diminish its own information heritage or disenfranchise
a portion of its own constituency. This results in a debasement of the cultural information heritage of a
country in the name of economic progress.
B. Globalization
{8} The second term - globalization - is also familiar. Globalization refers to the natural trend in information
access and control that is developing through market factors. In the new millennium, the dominant good or
service will certainly be information-based. [13] When assessing the trend in the globalization of the Internet,
primarily the World Wide Web, or the development of information products and services in traditional
spheres in recent years, one cannot help but be struck by the growing commodification of information. [14]
The commodification of information results in a globalization process whereby policy decisions involving the
right to control information, and the right to access that information are based solely upon the marketplace.
This commodification trend will be further discussed in a subsequent section of this article.
{9} Globalization does not, by its definition, limit its application to a market model. However, the reality
facing the interrelationships among sovereign states and actors within those states with other states and states'
actors is such that, the basis of those relationships is tied to the infiltration of commercial interests and the
dominance of market factors, to the exclusion of other principles. [15] Under this model, decisions
concerning information access and control are based primarily upon economic factors. [16] A decision, for
example, of an international media conglomerate to invest in a developing country is based not upon a
concern for the information needs or equity of that country's citizens. Rather, the decision is based upon
whether or not demand exists for the conglomerate's information product or service in that country and
whether the conglomerate could successfully meet and profit from that demand. [17] As a result, "[w]hile
some societies will be able to share some of the benefits of economic growth and welfare resulting from
globalisation [sic] others remain excluded and increasingly marginalized." [18] Further, what about the
marginalization of particular groups within a country that is generally advancing? This is a problem even
within the United States, for example, with the development of the concept of universal service in new
telecommunications settings. [19] Globalization is often characterized by the domination of external
economic forces upon another country.
{10} It takes time for a lesser-advantaged country to develop its markets. Consider the case of India or China.
For years, both countries were leading sources of copyright infringement of United States' information
products and services, especially computer programs. [20] India and China were also reluctant to join any
international copyright agreements. When India's and more recently - and to a lesser extent - China's own
intellectual property markets developed, and then other less-advantaged countries, in turn, pirated their
works, both countries became more concerned with supporting stricter international copyright enforcement.
[21] This enforcement would better position each country's information products and services in the global
marketplace. However, countries like India and China will have to continually weigh the cost of international
copyright enforcement among their own populations with the incentives of domestic productivity,
international investment, and possible dissolution of traditional views of property that may be inherent in
their cultures. [22]
{11} The implications of this domination are important if various commentators [23] are correct in their
assessment that intellectual property and information will become the currency of the Twenty-First Century.
Thus, those countries that have established intellectual property infrastructures will be at an advantage to
dominate internat'l markets. The national governments of sovereign states or multi-states will increasingly
play a role in designing protection measures for their own constituents, and if the direction of that protection
is in response to external forces, then a country's national information policy may become incongruent with
the needs of its own people. This can result in a commodification of culture. [24] The critical policy question
involves achieving the proper balance between establishing a climate of property-oriented incentives to
encourage information infrastructure investment and the rapid diffusion of technology, on the one hand, and
the provision of this investment climate at the possible exclusion of the public interest on the other. [25] In an
information marketplace geared towards globalization, achieving this balance becomes more difficult.
{12} Consequently, it should come as no surprise that, "[t]he digital revolution is good news for everyone in
the business of protecting intellectual property. As ideas and knowledge assume a larger part of the nation's
wealth and international trade, intellectual property protectors will become increasingly important to the
country's future." [26] Moreover, these primary players will likely be able to determine what the rules will be
for subsequent international players and their respective transactions. Like the industrial capital of the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, intellectual property and other information rights, such as the control of
the content of speech will become the "raw goods" and "working capital" of the new millennium. As a result,
those who have control over that information are placed in superior positions for the purposes of subsequent
information transfer and development. [27]
C. Amelioration
{13} The alternative to the above approaches is the concept of amelioration. This is perhaps a new concept,
but it does have its roots in the hopes originally placed upon the preceding concept of globalization.
Amelioration recognizes the connected and interrelated nature of the post-national era: the dissolution of
traditional boundaries (in the climate of existing globalization, this is perceived as a negative concept), but
also the potential for the structuring of new ones (in contrast, amelioration is seen as a positive concept).
Amelioration also recognizes the concept of harmonization that must occur naturally if the holders of diverse
interests are to find common ground upon which to build new relationships. However, amelioration is a
positive concept that envisions international intellectual property agreements, [28] or international
commercial development, [29] for example, that attempt to retain the intrinsic uniqueness of each sovereign
state, rather than to dismiss or to usurp that as primitive or otherwise unworthy.
{14} Whether mechanisms such as Pareto optimization or Rawlsian distributive justicen [30] can be
incorporated into existing international agreements remains to be seen. Consider the concept of economic
justice as applied to amelioration. Two alternative models of decision-making may be considered: Pareto
optimization and a Rawlsian notion of distributive justice (as based upon the work of John Rawls). Consider
the case of a country considering accession to an international agreement that would open its information
markets to foreign investment and development. A Pareto optimum approach to harmonization or
globalization would hold that no law, international treaty, or agreement should be adopted by a country, nor
its markets opened to foreign influence, unless all of the parties are no worse off by the activity and the
position of at least one party improves because of the action. Rawls would suggest that adoption or
implementation occur only if the least advantaged (namely, the developing country) is placed in a better
position as a result of the development of the information market infrastructure vis-à-vis the harmonized law
or globalization investment. Amelioration dictates that at least a Pareto optimum approach is taken, such that
no party, including the developing country is disadvantaged. Further, amelioration favors a Rawlsian
approach, as it is one in which the developing country is advantaged. In the current climate of harmonization
dominated by First World property interests, and globalization dominated by First World market interests,
neither occurs. As observed earlier, the developing, less-advantaged country is often left in a worse position.
{15} Arguably, these concerns were part of the original intent of concepts like harmonization and
globalization, but were quickly superceded as political and market forces dominated international relations.
The implementation of the amelioration concept remains a challenge for future commentators.
II. TRENDS IN INFORMATION OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE POST-NATIONAL
ERA
{16} In assessing the development of legal responses to information ownership and control, several themes
or trends emerge. These themes or trends attempt to categorize the "fall-out" from the
harmonization/commodification/globalization juggernaut. Identification and assessment of these trends is the
initial phase of the global policymaking activity. These themes place the recent information warfare disputes
into one of four models: iteration, redaction, reaction, and marginalization. While specific solutions are not
forwarded, the identification of these developments is helpful to subsequent commentators when formulating
and designing appropriate national and international policy responses. Once identified, these patterns may be
more keenly monitored and assessed within a country's policymaking processes, as well as within a broader
global policymaking agenda in order to minimize possible negative effects. The balance between information
owners with control rights and information users with access rights is dynamic. As harmonization and
globalization move forward, realignment often occurs. The re-adjustment often provides the opportunity for
the ascension of control rights as an incentive to development, but at the expense of access rights, which in
the long run, may hamper development. Having the observation tools to assist in the monitoring of these
developments may help thwart unwanted effects of these processes.
A. The Decline of Traditional Information Boundaries: Information Iteration
{17} The emergence of new information technologies, such as the Internet and the World Wide Web forces
traditional legal concepts of information to be adapted to these new environments. As a result, there is a
breakdown in traditional information boundaries. Iteration occurs when existing legal concepts are applied
with less than convincing results to web environments. The law attempts to place new or unknown
circumstances into known or existing categorizations or characterizations. When the match results in
analogies that are clumsy or intuitively unsound the integrity of the law - as an arbiter of information control
and access disputes - is questioned. As a result, there is a breakdown of the traditional information
boundaries.
{18} Two examples can be used to demonstrate this principle. Consider the application of the concepts of
free speech and copyright to the World Wide Web. Courts have tried to describe virtual space in terms that
are familiar, though less than precise. In a case involving the constitutionality of a law designed to regulate
content on the Internet, the United States Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he Web is thus comparable, from the
reader's viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and
a sprawling mall offering goods and services." [31] A subsequent lower federal court attempted to apply the
"Internet as a library" analogy in characterizing the use of a software filter to censor content in a public
library as similar to a "book removal," thus making it subject to strict scrutiny under First Amendment
jurisprudence. [32] The use of the software filter was found to be unconstitutional. As the federal court stated:
After considering both arguments, we conclude that defendants have misconstrued the nature of
the Internet. By purchasing Internet access, each Loudoun library has made all Internet
publications instantly accessible to its patrons . . . In effect, by purchasing one such publication,
the library has purchased them all. The Internet therefore more closely resembles the plaintiff's
analogy of a collection of encyclopedias from which defendants have laboriously redacted
portions deemed unfit for library patrons. [33]
{19} The problem is that, while both decisions represent victories for free speech advocates, the analogy used
by courts thus far does not seem to comport with how library collections are actually built and constructed by
library professionals. [34] These judicial analogies and characterizations are ill-suited to emerging
technological media.
{20} Likewise, courts have struggled to apply traditional "photocopying" scenarios to Internet copying and
browsing with less than convincing articulation. One court decided that an online service provider was not
responsible for the postings of others on its system. A federal district court reasoned
that Netcom's act of designing or implementing a system that automatically and uniformly
creates temporary copies of all data sent through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying
machine who lets the pubic make copies with it. Although some of the people using the machine
may directly infringe copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner's liability under the rubric of
contributory infringement, not direct infringement. [35]
{21} Later, the court also observed that browsing was allowed in digital environments, even though as a
precursor to the viewer's act of reading or observing the image on the screen, a "copy" is made that resides in
the computer's RAM. The court concluded:
It [browsing] is the functional equivalent of reading, which does not implicate the copyright laws
and may be done by anyone in a library without the permission of the copyright owner. However,
it can be argued that the effects of digital browsing are different because millions can browse a
single copy of a work in cyberspace, while only one can read a library's copy at a time. [36]
{22} This difficulty of applying copyright concepts from the analog world to the digital world has not
escaped comment by scholars. [37] If courts cannot adequately characterize new information disputes with
consistency, the digital environment may threaten existing legal mechanisms of information order altogether.
For example, several commentators predict that copyright will cease to exist as a mechanism for ordering
rights between owners and users. [38] This is due primarily to the high transaction costs associated with the
use of copyrighted materials in digital environments. Users have the ability to make perfect copies with great
speed and to distribute the copies to multiple users with as much ease. [39] Likewise, copyright owners have
little ability to track or control impermissible uses. [40] In its place, many commentators see the rise of
alternative legal doctrines that were never intended to apply to copyright-like information. [41] One example
is the misappropriation doctrine. This doctrine is reflected in the NBA game pager litigation in which the
Second Circuit articulated a "hot news" exception for the use of real-time event information. [42]
Misappropriation was also one of the claims in a recent web-link dispute. [43] However, that case is
indicative of the types of suits likely to arise as information owners seek new legal mechanisms to control
their interests. Originally designed to remedy "takings" in a commercial setting, misappropriation is ill-suited
for situations were public rights, such as fair use and access rights to basic factual information are involved.
{23} Another recent development is the rise in private contracts to negotiate ownership and use rights
between parties. This can be seen in the recent discussions concerning the revision of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") and the proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA")
which would make information a "good" subject to contract terms, just like any other good. [44] This trend is
also evidenced in the proliferation of shrink-wrap licenses, and web-wrap licenses now in use. These licenses
have received judicial imprimatur from the Seventh Circuit when it validated the use of such mechanisms to
protect otherwise uncopyrightable information. [45] The facts of that case are instructive of the dangerous
effects that an iterative information environment may have on information access. The defendant,
Zeidenberg, purchased a ProCD CD-ROM of telephone subscriber information, and in keeping with existing
copyright law, extracted the unprotected names, addresses, and telephone numbers, created his own search
software, and loaded the contents onto the Internet much to the chagrin of ProCD. At the district court level,
Judge Crabb, relying on previous law, [46] ruled in favor of Zeidenberg. [47]
{24} On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected every point of the district court opinion. For example, the
validity of the shrink-wrap license was upheld because "Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the
software, learned of the license, and did not reject the goods." [48] The most important point made by Judge
Easterbrook is that a user of copyrighted material may bargain away his copyright fair use right or other "use"
privileges if that user or consumer chooses to do so. [49] For example, another such use right is the first sale
doctrine, which allows a purchaser of copyrighted material to dispose, through gift or resale, of the
copyrighted material. The right of control over the work by the copyright holder ends after the first sale of
that work to any given consumer. The Seventh Circuit decision explicitly permits a publisher to protect
uncopyrightable information by private contract. [50] This information would otherwise be available for
reuse or republishing under fair use or other provisions, such as the first sale doctrine of the copyright law.
The court also validated the use of shrink-wrap license to protect software and the validity of web-wrap and
click-on licenses.
{25} The result highlighted from case law such as that raised in the Seventh Circuit is the emergence of a
normative Internet regime based upon private contract. Commentators have been critical of reliance on
private ordering on the Internet. [51] Allowing the rights of information users to be determined solely by
contract will generally benefit only those parties that have the power, in terms of bargaining and parity of
contract, to negotiate. Most individual users, such as Zeidenberg, are simply not in a fortunate position from
which to bargain.
{26} Traditional legal concepts are also difficult to apply when assessing commercial activity on the World
Wide Web. The problems arise in those circumstances where a formal contract does not exist, but some other
level of interaction between the parties does exist. This interaction must rise to a level of sufficient contacts
with the forum state and the cause of action to satisfy the "minimum contacts test" set forth by the Supreme
Court. [52] However, the law is far from well-settled in the more complex and ambiguous situations, such
that, "[i]n cases in which a defendant's electronic contact with a foreign jurisdiction is based on a Web site
that is accessed in that jurisdiction and not accompanied by a contractual relationship, courts have reached
disparate conclusions." [53] Courts consider what level of activity must occur in a commercial website
setting between the owner or proprietor in one jurisdiction, and a customer in another jurisdiction, before
concluding that the owner-proprietor was "doing business in" or otherwise engaged in sufficient minimum
contact. [54] Jurisdiction can be either general, if it is the result of continuous and systematic contacts, or
specific, when resulting from the website owner-proprietor's contacts with the forum.
{27} In the real world, when a customer walks into a store, the jurisdiction (i.e., general jurisdiction) is
established by the store's physical presence and its daily activity that is substantial or continuous and
systematic. How does this concept apply when the store exists in cyberspace? Virtual courts do not exist,
therefore the practical matter of which forum should settle the dispute still needs resolution among the parties
to the litigation. The customer would like to litigate the case for most practical purposes in his home
jurisdiction. For better or for worse, this same logic -- presence of store or a commercial site establishes
general jurisdiction -- does translate to the Internet. What about the minimum contacts necessary to establish
specific jurisdiction?
{28} Most courts have held that mere presence on the World Wide Web is not sufficient to establish
jurisdiction. [55] However, in Bochan v. La Fontaine, [56] the court concluded that, since a Texas Usenet
member's posting must, at some point, be stored on America Online's server in Virginia, jurisdiction existed
in the latter state. One commentator recently speculated on the unpredictability of judicial responses to
jurisdiction in the online realm: "Bochan is viewed widely as an aberration, but it does show that courts still
can throw curves in an arena in which the law and technology are changing rapidly, and of which judges have
divergent perceptions." [57] If the website owner-proprietor physically resides in another jurisdiction, then
extending the customer's home jurisdiction over the personage of the website owner should occur on some
reasonable legal basis. Some courts have looked to the amount of inter-activity that the web site allows its
customers to engage in while visiting the site, establishing a sort of sliding scale of Internet-based contacts.
[58]
{29} Generally, a mere web presence is not enough, i.e., just because a customer can access a web site from
his jurisdiction, that jurisdiction should have forum rights over the website owner. However, the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has held that a mere hyperlink, providing "direct access" from one site to
another associates the two as a single electronic document for purposes of the insider trading laws. [59] But,
should the mere ability to access or to link to a site from one jurisdiction be tantamount to a "presence" for
purposes of exerting the potential of legal remedy, i.e., the establishment of the minimum contacts of specific
jurisdiction? The problem is exacerbated when one considers the international ramifications of making these
policy decisions. Consider the following case in point: the Georgia Institute of Technology needed to defend
itself in a French court because its website was not also available in French, and thus, violated the French law
requiring use of the French language. The case was dismissed, but not until after the initial complaint was
filed and the defendant answered. Furthermore, the dismissal was not based upon the lack of jurisdiction. [60]
{30} A final example is found the inability of trademark law to adequately adapt to web environments. This
occurs because principles of federal trademark registration, for example, allow for similar or identical
trademarks in differing product or geographic markets. [61] Similar or identical marks may coexist as long as
there is no consumer confusion. [62] Unfortunately, this concept is not easily translatable to the World Wide
Web. Thus, the use of domain name information is less freely available in the digital environment. [63] This
occurs because, while there may be a Lexus automobile manufacturer and a LEXIS-NEXIS online database,
or a Beretta automobile and a Beretta firearm, there can only be one entity with the domain name
"beretta.com." [64] In the physical non-digital world, use of the word "Beretta" by each company is possible
under trademark law. [65] This is a practical impossibility in the digital world, as there can be only one
"beretta.com" domain name. [66]
{31} Another interesting development results when individuals try to exploit the limitations of domain name
assignment technology. F. Lawrence Street observes that, similar to other limited commodities, competition
for domain names motivates parties to reserve certain domain names in hopes of later selling that name to the
owner of the trademark with the same name. [67] To a commercial entity, a domain name, like a trademark,
has great value. [68] This has led to the development of a futures market for domain names with savvy
individuals staking claims to numerous domain names, in the hopes of later selling the registration to wealthy
corporations. [69] Companies have become incensed upon discovery that someone has reserved the obvious
or likely domain name for their company's product or service. In fact, the law has developed a name for these
domain name usurpers: "cybersquatters." [70] Dennis Toeppen, has, at one time or another, been the owner of
over 200 different domain names, including "deltaairlines.com," "britishairways.com,"
"northwestairlines.com," "ramadainn.com," "eddiebauer.com," and "neiman-marcus.com." [71] In Avery
Dennison Corp. v Sumpton, [72] Free View Listings, another cybersquatter, registered over 12,000 surnames
as domain names. [73] Not surprisingly, Toeppen and other cybersquatters have been successfully sued on
trademark infringement or trademark dilution claims. [74]
{32} One way for a company that believes its cybermark has been misappropriated to protest the transaction
is to file a petition with Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), the organization that administers the domain name
system. [75] Challengers choose the NSI forum because the overwhelming number of disputes are resolved
by NSI in favor of the challengers. [76] In cases of true cybersquatting, this may be the correct result, but
many other trademark holders have abused the system, taking advantage of the NSI policy and moving
against legitimate cyber domain name registrants. [77] This abuse of the system dedicated to curbing the
misappropriation of domain names has led some to comment that, "[t]hese cases illustrate what has come to
be a practice known as reverse domain name hijacking." [78] The NSI policy is perhaps indicative of the
general reaction to the new "cyber space," the breakdown of traditional rules of property.
{33} Global responses are also developing. [79] The recent WIPO Final Report of the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process (the "WIPO Report") [80] details procedures for resolution in situations of abusive
registrations and famous mark only. However, the WIPO Report does not offer alternatives to the simple fact
that, while commercial entities may operate with similar trademarks without violating the principles of the
trademark law, there can be only one owner of a domain name with the .com gTLD. This problem is further
complicated by the fact that there are a limited number of unrestricted gTLDs (.com, .net, and .org).
{34} As traditional information boundaries are stretched to adapt to the new legal challenges of the Internet,
the existing information order breaks down. Information owners and users are no longer sure of their
responsibilities and opportunities with respect to the use of information. Iteration occurs, in which the law
attempts, often with inconsistent or inadequate results, to arbitrate between opposing parties, as is the normal
function of the law. New meta-information boundaries have arisen, which offer the potential for a further loss
of public rights in information. These are described in more detail in the following section.
B. Ascension of New Meta-Information Boundaries: Information Redaction
{35} Redaction in the legal infrastructure supporting the information environment occurs when new barriers
or boundaries are created that may impact upon a state's or individual's access to, or use of information. This
redaction can be international in scope or it can occur within a sovereign state. The earlier section of this
article discussing the emerging concepts of harmonization and globalization recounted the developments
involving trends in international copyright and sui generis protection for collections of information, e.g.,
databases. Here, two additional examples serve to illustrate the specific point of redaction. Redaction is often
a legal response to the "newness" of the Internet as a medium. Current legal "solutions" to so-called
information harms or wrongs are edited or redacted, to commit principles that, in the analog world, would
simply not apply or extend.
{36} Consider the recent attempts to regulate the content of Internet communications in the United States.
[81] Laws have been drafted to protect users from unsavory content. The Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA"), part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, [82] was designed to protect minors from
indecent transmissions and patently offensive displays. The problem was that the statute, as enacted,
effectively prevented anyone from sending or displaying indecent or patently offensive material. A
community organization that posted on its website sexually explicit material, targeted at preventing unwanted
pregnancy or sexually-transmitted diseases among teenagers might be guilty of a felony. Likewise, high
school students who e-mailed each other about their "sexual experiences" might also face prosecution. [83]
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. [84] In its place, however,
Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 ("COPA"), [85] but the new law was
euphemistically referred to as the "CDA II" or the "baby CDA." While, the new law purported to restrict the
availability of materials to minors, the effect of the law was to restrict adults from communicating and
receiving expression that is otherwise protected under the First Amendment. The law targeted the commercial
providers of information by imposing a series of checks that would force content providers to censor
themselves or simply to withdraw from the Internet medium. The law is under current court challenge. [86]
Both statutes are examples of legal restrictions forwarded by legislatures that not only extend the reach of the
law into cyberspace, but also extend that reach beyond what was normally thought to be the conforming
limits of the law. [87] In response to the "newness" of the Internet environment, legislatures often see fit to
regulate conduct beyond that which can be proscribed in an analog or print-based setting.
{37} Another example of sweeping legal reform in cyberspace also derives its origin from the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Online Family Empowerment provision of the CDA. [88] This
provision remains in effect today, as it was not part of the previous constitutional challenge. The current
version of 47 U.S.C. §230(c) creates a "good samaritan" provision that was originally drafted to protect
providers of an "interactive computer service" from tort liability, when attempts to prevent defamatory
postings on their bulletin board services are unsuccessful. Developing case law held the provider responsible
for postings made by third parties when the provider made assertions that it would protect users from such
rogue postings. [89] The law was, in part, a response to the burgeoning cybertort litigation that, if unchecked,
was perceived to have the potential to dampen free discourse in bulletin boards, chat rooms, and other
asynchronous communication technologies. Congress wanted to remedy this scenario and to reward online
service providers with tort immunity for their attempts. [90] This amounted to sweeping legislation, as courts
have begun to apply the new law not only in cases of defamation, [91] but also in litigation for other
negligent postings of material deemed harmful or injurious. [92] In fact, one could argue that the protection
afforded by 47 U.S.C. §230 offers greater protection against online service providers than would most
defamation statutes against a publisher in the print world. Section 230 is becoming a mega-immunity statute,
protecting online service providers from many types of civil harms. [93] A practical result is that individual
actors who are harmed may find their remedies limited, as the intermediary actor is now insulated from
liability, while pursuing remedy against the individual defamer is impractical. [94] This raises the question of
where it is most logical to place the responsibility for enforcement and remedy: at the online service
provider/intermediary level or with individual actors (i.e., aggrieved parties needing to sue the offending
party)?
{38} This expansion of control and regulation through law is indicative of redactive information
environments. One practical result is that, because plaintiffs can no longer sue service providers, as those
providers now have immunity under the law, the only recourse is to suffer the harm or to proceed after
individual litigants. The latter option is sometimes not viable because it is either cost-prohibitive, the
individual publishers-posters are judgment proof, or online service providers are reluctant to release the name
of an individual poster from their internal records. As a result, the law, while curtailing litigation against
service providers, may make the actual perpetrators of the harm less likely to be held responsible because of
the difficulty of individual litigants pursuing remedy and receiving compensation for harms. This result is far
less efficient than the recent law, also part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, [95] discussed earlier,
that arbitrates similar disputes against online service providers for postings of infringing copyright materials
by third parties on their systems. [96] The new law assigns liability to the service providers only if it had
knowledge of the infringing posting and failed to take appropriate action to remove it.
C. Emergence of Self Protection Measures Increase: Information Reaction
{39} The information environment of the post-national era is characterized by flux. The two trends discussed
thus far, iteration, which is the inadequate application of legal norms to cyberspace in arbitrating information
disputes, and redaction, which is the expansion of legal norms to cyberspace in an attempt to regulate
information, pave the way for yet a third trend. As a result of the uncertainty in the ability of the law to
preserve the information status quo, policymakers, with the support of information owners, have reacted by
seeking alternative measures to protect their interests. Two examples are the sui generis database protection
legislation discussed earlier and another sui generis protection measure passed to protect high technology
mask works and products in semiconductor computer chips. [97] The latter sui generis legislation blends
copyright, patent trademark, and patent regimes into a "super hybrid high law" that protects United States
high technology through the exclusive grant of chip production rights for up to ten years.
{40} A similar market-oriented protectionism response was recently instituted in the area of trademark
infringement that established controls against the importation of "gray market" goods into the United States.
Self-protection information environments typically develop in response to control gaps left by the failure of
iteration or redaction. Self-protection measures can be instigated by individual information owners to protect
their interests or by policymakers concerned about maintaining the strength of national interests. It can also
be viewed as a response to the jockeying by commercial entities for market advantage that ensues as a result
of the harmonization and globalization processes.
{41} As an example, "gray market" protection in the United States has increased in response to a recent
decision by the Supreme Court in Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. [98] Two
intellectual property scholars surmised that, "[t]he gray market is a multibillion-dollar industry based on the
importation of copyrighted or trademarked materials without consent of the owner of those intellectual
property rights. This parallel importation creates a second, unauthorized distribution system that competes
with the domestic system authorized by the manufacturer." [99] The Supreme Court decision has controlling
significance for "gray market" importation in the entertainment, publishing, and other copyright industries.
[100]
{42} In its opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that the importation right under 17 U.S.C. § 602 is part of
the distribution right under 17 U.S.C. §106. This distribution right is, in turn, limited by various provisions of
the copyright law, such as the fair use provision of 17 U.S.C. §107, and the first sale doctrine, as expressed in
17 U.S.C. §109. The first sale doctrine is a statutory expression of the perpetuity concept; it limits the
copyright owner's right to control the subsequent disposition or transfer of legitimate copies of the work after
the first sale is made. According to the Court, the copyright law would not operate to protect the domestic
sales due to the first sale doctrine. The first sale doctrine, like the concept of fair use is an access right that
insures that public good is served by excepting from the copyright owner's exclusive rights, uses or transfers
of the work by others.
{43} Commercial entities were left seeking other protection measures in the wake of the Supreme Court
Quality King decision. In essence, the Court recognized a "loophole" for gray market goods. This occurs
when a United States domestic company sells or exports the product to a foreign entity, often at a lower price
that is consistent with the anticipated revenue of the foreign market. It is obvious that the domestic company-
exporter cannot control the resale of the product by the foreign entity at this point in the scenario. The foreign
entity then imports the product back into the United States and the product is sold below the domestically-
priced product by a third party. This interferes with the domestic sales of the product by the domestic
company. It is at this point that domestic companies attempted to control the resale of the product in the
United States, but were thwarted by the Supreme Court's application of the first sale doctrine. Now, the
International Trade Commission, upon a filing of a complaint by an aggrieved party whose products are re-
introduced into United States markets, will issue an exclusion order, as well as a civil penalty up to $100,000
per violation that prevents importation of the "gray market" product into the United States. In the past, the
exporter would have had to file time-consuming and expensive suits against individual importers. [101] In a
similar fashion, this preventive mechanism is analogous to the European Commission's decision to ban the
existence of duty-free shopping in member states by June 30, 1999.
{44} The import controls placed upon the competition to a nation's intellectual property markets is an
example of self-protection measures enacted to respond to a threat, perceived or real, that policymakers view
as a challenge to their control over the information. In other cases, the individual commercial entities within
the sovereign state or multi-state may, with national endorsement, construct their own protective reaction
measures. An example of this is the recent development of copyright management systems. The major
Clinton Administration blueprint for copyright reform, the "White Paper" [102] advocates the use of
encryption, digital signatures, and stenography that consists of watermarking or codes, which would be
embedded in copyrighted works and would function as identification, tracking, and use signatures.
{45} This electronic "lock and key" solution to copyright infringement in digital settings was accepted as part
of the settlement in Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc. [103] In addition to $568,000 in damages,
CompuServe agreed to administer the online licensing scheme. In the Frank case, music publishers alleged
that a CompuServe bulletin board system ("BBS") connected to the Internet allowed users to download
copyrighted songs. According to Raysman and Brown, [104] the settlement-licensing scheme could develop
into an industry standard. If these digital gate-keeping technologies are adopted, one result might be that
every use of copyrighted material would entail a cost to the user, in spite of fair use concepts. This would
represent a drastic change in the extent of the public information space available. [105] Further, Congress has
provided its tacit endorsement of these measures by passing legislation prohibiting the removal or alteration
of such copyright management information if the intent is to induce infringement. [106] The selling of
copyright management circumvention devices is also prohibited. The law also implements the recent WIPO
copyright agreements discussed earlier in this article.
D. The Loss of Public Space: Information Marginalization
{46} There is a loss of public space when information becomes marginalized. This occurs as commercial
interests supercede cultural or educational information interests. The problems that result when
harmonization or globalization mechanisms fail to incorporate or to accommodate indigenous or cultural
attitudes towards information have been presented earlier. Two other examples serve to demonstrate this
principle. Recent discussions focusing on the expansion of top-level domain name suffixes have focused
predominantly upon commercial interests. New names will include the following: ".firm" for businesses or
firms, ".store" for businesses offering goods for purchase, ".info" for businesses providing information
services, ".web" for businesses providing web services, ".arts" for cultural and entertainment activities, ".rec"
for businesses involved in recreational activities, and ".nom" for domain names for individuals. [107] Absent
in the top-level domain name expansion are categories designed to guarantee the identification of sites
designated for public inquiry, much like the public television, public radio, or local access cable lines that are
currently reserved for public purposes. In addition, the use of ".XXX" for adult sites [108] or ".child" for
those sites safe for children might also facilitate the Internet zoning approach Justice O'Connor advocated in
her concurrence in the Reno decision. [109] A domain name, such as ".pub" might be used to distinguish
those true public-oriented sites from general non-profit ".org" entities that are still "positional" in nature (i.e.,
that in some way advocate or represent a particular position). Like the development of the Internet, but to a
lesser extent, the development of the domain name registration system has been criticized for its emphasis on
commercial and other private interests to the exclusion of public interests. [110] The dominance of virtual
location devices, or domain names geared towards commercial or private interests is another indication that
commercial or other private interests are permeating the World Wide Web.
{47} The digital environment was also seen as an opportunity for the privacy interests of children to be
marginalized. In the early 1990's, the practices of online marketers in targeting children as research targets
came under scrutiny. [111] Children were often unknowingly, due to sub-developed consumer acumen,
releasing vast amounts of personal information about themselves and their families. The lack of consumer
savvy in children, coupled with the ease of engaging children online and soliciting information from them in
network environments, allowed marketers to circumvent the normal protection parental supervision offers.
While there is a rich depository of literature supporting the protection of children in a broader human rights
capacity (e.g., health, education, and other general welfare issues), [112] little thought was given to the
protection of children in a market or consumer context. The network environment challenges existing thought
concerning the topics within which child welfare issues are debated. [113] For example, inquiry was often
disguised in the form of a game, contest, or club. Further parental authorization was not sought. Existing law
provided limited application. The collection and use of consumer information under circumstances that are
false or misleading is an unfair trade practice. [114] However, specific statutory protections, as opposed to
reliance on federal regulatory oversight alone, were sought. [115] As a result, the COPA [116] was passed in
essence, to codify the Federal Trade Commission's position.
{48} Another example of the marginalization of World Wide Web users is occurring in American distance
education environments. Web-based distance education students have fewer fair use rights than their "live"
counterparts at the same university. The problem arises because it is unclear, the extent to which, the concepts
of fair use contained in 17 U.S.C. §107 and the educational "fair use" guidelines drafted under that section,
[117] apply to distance education settings. More importantly, other sections of the copyright law designed to
allow educational uses of copyrighted material in the classroom may not translate well to the distance
education environment. For example, 17 U.S.C. §110, does not, as written, allow for such performances or
displays over the Internet. Section 110 allows educators to show, perform, or display copyrighted works, such
as video cassette recordings to a live classroom, as long as the subject of the video is related to the course
content and the showing is to class members only. There is no provision to allow for the showing of the same
video to students in a web-based course, not to that portion of students in a class who are web-based. In fact,
under a reasonable reading of the current law, that act is prohibited. These web-based, virtual students are
penalized simply because of the nature of their spatial interaction with the classroom teaching environment,
i.e., because the students are in a virtual classroom. [118] In this way, the information interests of web-based
students under current copyright law are marginalized.
III. APPLICATIONS: INTERNET MYTHS AND REALITIES
{49} This article concludes with a review of several myths that are often forwarded in the debate against
those who attempt to regulate, through law, conduct in cyberspace. The myths are not so much rebutted with
alternative maxims, but questioned in the hopes of forwarding an understanding of why these legal
controversies have developed - and will continue to develop - in cyber society. The first myth is a general
statement that conduct and content cannot be regulated on the Internet through law because the Internet is an
open system, with no boundaries, and thus, law cannot practically apply. Another myth is that the best
characterization of the Internet is that of "last frontier." In this characterization, virtual space may or may not
be limitless, but there is much uncharted territory, and those who stake their claim to it first will come to
control it. It forwards a first come-first serve, "most powerful-most control" attitude towards cyberspace.
Next, the concept of the Internet as virtual "green space" or a commons is critiqued. In this modality, the
public nature of the Internet must be preserved at all costs. Unfortunately, like the green spaces of old,
degradation of this commons can also occur in the context of cyberspace. In contrast, the reality of recent
World Wide Web litigation suggests that society is already adopting legal concepts and nomenclature to
concepts of virtual spaces, i.e., with the emergence of terms like "cybertort" and "cyber squatter." All of the
myths in some sense presuppose an attitude of less law or a lesser role for public governance than currently
exists in physical space. It is as if proponents of these models view the Internet as their last chance for
anarchy, or at least for regulatory climates on terms which envision the proponents of a particular myth to be
in control of the information access and use rights of others.
A. The Myth of Virtuality
{50} The first myth is a general statement that conduct and content cannot be regulated on the Internet
through law because the Internet is an open system, with no boundaries, and thus, laws cannot practically
apply. This myth is rooted in the belief that the Internet is so new that present social norms and institutions
are unprepared to fathom its workings and to interact with technology in a reasonable, socially structured
way. For example, proponents such as Peter Huber would remove any role for public governance vis-à-vis the
legal regulation of communicative behavior. [119] Proponents of this view have called for the cessation of
intellectual property right principles in cyberspace as well, and they advocate a move towards private laws or
completely self-regulating norms. [120] This view is the perspective of "Internet libertarianism" taken to its
logical and extreme conclusion. This idea itself is based upon the inability of the medium or technology to
control information flows. For example, a statute of one country forbidding the sending of obscene
information cannot practically control senders of the material in another country. [121] At best, such laws can
be designed only to control the receipt of information. In theory, this over-taxes the information system as
undesirable information makes its way into the system, or onto the Internet in this case, before it can be
regulated. Control exists only at the down-stream end. Similarly, recent developments in copyright
management technology work the same way. [122] The technology does not necessarily work to prevent
illegal uploading of pirated material onto the Internet, but renders its down-stream use, such as the
downloading of a copy, unusable or traceable.
{51} It is not clear what type of order, if any, would exist in this "Internet of virtuality." However, it seems an
unsound course upon which to embark. This is so for several reasons. First, the law is already adapting
existing principles to various Internet controversies. True, courts and legislatures still struggle against each
other over which particular path to take. For instance, the battle over content regulation on the Internet
recounted in the Reno decisions [123] provides a case in point. Yet, the paradigm of Internet law that is
developing is, for better or for worse, based upon existing legal maxims. There will always be adjustment in
law, but the law's ability to adapt, to remain in flux and uncertain at times, is also its blessing in the post-
national era. The law currently allows order in cyberspace to develop within the existing legal information
infrastructure. Terms such as "cyber squatter," "cybertort" and "cyber smear" [124] indicate that the
application of known legal tenets to the Internet is possible and even desirable. If this ordering does not
occur, what is left? Would self-regulating mechanisms develop equitably on the Internet without public
governance or intervention?
{52} Perhaps less overt, but nonetheless pernicious is the increase in the number of advocates for self-
normative regulation of the Internet. In reality, this option envisions a series of private rights as the dominant
mode of information access vis-à-vis the freedom to contract. Without a system of public law, private
interests will dominate the rights of parties in information transactions. In this case, contract will dominate
relationships between remote Internet actors. This is unsound for two reasons. First, it assumes some
normative structure to enforce the contract or game rules in the first instance. Thus, the proponents of Internet
virtuality see the role of public law as rather self-serving of private interests, i.e., contract enforcing or at least
contract regulating. Second and most important, it requires parity among actors, which is simply not the case
on the Internet. This is problematic because equitable contract rights are premised upon the somewhat equal
and consistent bargaining right of the parties. In contract law, an agreement drafted unilaterally by a dominant
party and then presented on a "take it or leave it basis" to the weaker party with no real opportunity to bargain
concerning the terms of the agreement is known as a contract of adhesion. [125] Adhesion contracts may be
voided on the grounds that this uneven distribution of bargaining power, if exercised, would result in a
contract that is unconscionable, and thereby against public policy. The shrink wrap license illustration
discussed earlier in this article is often cited as an example of an adhesion contract. [126] If the so-called
"information poor" are left to their own devices with the unequal bargaining that results from this position, to
acquire the means for improvement, there is little hope for true information equity. A new term, "information
adhesion" is used to describe the process of market-based information alignment and control, that, in the
present discussion is expressed through the mechanism of private contracting, favors those with a dominant
bargaining position, and results in information inequity. This "adhesion of information" can occur where the
parties are nation-states or within a state between commercial owners and individual users of information, as
the ProCD litigation and U.C.C. and UCEDA reforms suggest.
{53} Third, assuming that natural progression self-regulating or private contracting schemes result in survival
or dominance of the economically or politically fittest, those who are at an advantage will remain so.
Moreover, without a system of public laws that reserve and protect the public interest, new communication
technologies will become vehicles for further subjugation of lesser actors instead of liberating media. The
problem with this approach is that, while it may offer opportunities and incentives for new economic and
other development free from state regulation, it also assumes a certain parity among remaining actors, or put
another way, it places a moral imperative on subsequent transactions. It may not matter to individual users of
the Web who desire to order concert tickets if Microsoft in-links to the Ticketmaster site. [127] It may at first
appear that many disputes do not affect individual users. Consider disputes that occur between unequal
commercial actors in vertical competition markets: from service provider to bulletin board operator and then
downward establishing individual liability for copyright infringement or tortious act, e.g., the Netcom and
Zeran situations. Likewise dominant information stakeholders may also compete in similar horizontal
markets, as was depicted by the NBA game pager litigation involving competition among providers of real
time game scores. [128]
{54} However, the precedent established in these controversies will control when individuals interact through
the contract model with these larger private or commercial actors. The ProCD litigation and developments in
U.C.C. Article 2b revisions suggest a growing acceptance of this model that is disturbing. Many participants
similarly situated to Zeidenberg will not have the bargaining power to negotiate, and so must take what
information owners offer on owners' terms or take nothing at all. This scenario creates a parity dynamic.
Private law need not replace public law in Internet settings; in fact, the latter may bring stability to the
Internet. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that traditional legal precedent is overriding what Internet
customs or self-governing practices have arisen. [129]
B. The Myth of the Last Frontier:
{55} Related to the virtuality myth is a position that attempts, at least in the United States, to hearken back to
bygone days of the westward expansion of the American Frontier. In a global context, this might be akin to
the days of world discovery and colonization. This myth presumes a certain manifest destiny to the Internet
as well. [130] The myth is based upon the "cult of bigness" and limitless space that dominates the
expansionist and territorial designs of the elite. [131] The view might best be articulated as the myth of the
Internet as the "last frontier." But, this myth is problematic for several reasons. While some attributes of the
Internet might fit within this rather romantic notion of technology, it too suffers from a belief that an
unregulated climate is the best one in which to base Internet participation. This perception is related to the
myth of viruality, but whereas, virtuality anticipates self-regulating normative structures to dominate
information transactions, the myth of the Internet as a "last frontier" sees no role for normative behavior
whatsoever. Often, this movement is associated with the original hacking and cyber-counter-culture that
developed in the early days of the Internet. [132]
{56} Like the frontier land and resource-consuming perspectives of the early settlers, the "cult of bigness"
sees ownership and property accumulation as a "good" in and of itself. Instead of pitting the fences of the
sheep ranchers and the homesteader against the open range of the cattle drovers, the myth of the Internet as
one of the "last frontier" places, contrasts for example, the commercial interests of the website owners against
free-link proponents. Social mobility is symbolized in the ability to own or control property, real or virtual.
Those who do not own property in their own right are trespassers. Applied to the Internet, it relegates those
without the information, poor or needy, as mere interlopers, but never true participants.
{57} Underlying this myth is the belief that in a completely open and unregulated frontier system, limitless
opportunity will abound. [133] Yet, this is simply not the case with the Internet. Some mechanisms actually
work less well in cyberspace. Consider the problem of domain name registrations discussed previously in this
article. Instead of a "last frontier" for trademarks in cyberspace, the limitations of technology actually make
the development and use of trademarks as domain names in cyberspace less available. There are other legal
anomalies in the transition from physical to virtual reality of the cyberspace last frontier. If the Internet, as the
"last frontier" analogy, is to have merit, then the ability to move into new virtual frontier property spaces,
should expand, not retract. This is not occurring; rather, quite the opposite transpires. It is in the application
of a traditional property right, i.e., trespass, [134] that ownership rights in cyberspace have actually
expanded, resulting in a decrease in the ability to move within cyber-information-space. This can be
evidenced in the expansion of personal property rights in individual cyberspaces such as e-mail accounts.
This "fencing-in" phenomenon would be in direct opposition to the limitless space of the manifest destiny of
the "cyber-frontier" model. To some extent in web-link controversies, [135] but more interestingly, in e-mail
communications, the assent of privacy concepts to protect recipients from unwanted solicitations emerges to
the forefront. This privacy right, based upon the property law doctrine of trespass as applied to the virtual
space, has been held to protect personal e-mail space. [136] This propertization of cyberspace is antithetical
to the notion of it as being a "last frontier." Strangely, this application of trespass to cyberspace creates far
greater privacy rights for consumers in the cyber-marketplace, than currently exist in the physical space of
traditional mail or analog communications. The use of criminal sanctions in the junk e-mail privacy cases
[137] is also increasing the height of the cyberspace fences that can be constructed.
{58} Finally, reliance on the "last frontier" model of cyberspace leads to an environment in which any
arbitration is metered out, like in the days of the Old West by vigilante justice. Those with the fastest gun
were usually correct, as those who opposed them were not around to ask questions. Likewise, the
development of information vigilantism resulted in an Internet environment where private interests will
operate completely unregulated, either against public interests or other less substantial private interests.
Without any public governance, the only legitimizing act of information use is found in its access or the
control over its access. If one obtains access to the information or control over others' access by whatever
means available (i.e., through the process of information vigilantism), it will be deemed a legitimate access,
in so far as the information vigilante is concerned. Without public governance over the information, those
without the information must also resort to vigilantism to obtain access to the information, as the process is
further rationalized. Gone are the concepts and mechanisms that attempt to identify proper from improper
acquisitions, such as trade secret and misappropriation of business information, or copyright and fair use of
published material. Furthermore, the only recourse is also vigilantism. In the online environment, this means
that a remedy is chosen from one of three possible courses of action. First, one can re-acquire or steal the
information back. Second, one can acquire or steal other information in its place, possibly, in a spirit of
retaliation. Third, one can engage in self-protection measures, which may or may not be possible or
affordable by the information victims. Faced with these limited alternatives, this model may even stifle
competition because legitimate business enterprises will be reluctant or unable to venture into this
environment. The only rule of law is whether the information can actually be accessed or downloaded,
scanned, etc., but not whether it is proper to do so. Thus, to the information vigilante, access or acquisition is
synonymous with the right to the information.
C. The Myth of "Internet Commons" or "Green Space"
{59} A final myth that tends to support a desire for less traditional legal structure in cyberspace is a view of
the Internet as a gigantic "commons" or "green space." This myth envisions slightly more order than the "last
frontier" ideology, but still believes that unlimited public spaces are possible in cyberspace. It is a desire for
lawlessness as well, but instead of coming from a commercial or private enterprise, like the virtuality myth,
or the reactionary elements of the cyber- counter-culture or vigilantes under the "last frontier" myth, it comes
instead from the public interest proponents. [138] In principle, there is nothing unsavory in this view.
However, like the other two model-myths, it also does not adequately characterize the reality of the Internet,
and like the other two myths, if embraced, will do more harm than good. Perhaps one flaw is that it ignores
the contribution that the private sector and rules of law are making towards universal access on the Internet.
Like it or not, it is the private sector, in the United States, that is bearing the financial burden for the
construction of the technical information infrastructure. It does not seem unreasonable that the legal
information infrastructure should reward, within limits, these efforts. Still, a closer look at the myth of the
Internet as a "commons" or "green space" is warranted.
{60} Like the "commons" or "green space" concepts of old, the tragedy of the commons is that, if use of the
commons or common space is left completely unregulated, the space will be overused and eventually no one
will be able to benefit from it. [139] The question is whether this analogy holds true for the Internet, both in
terms of its use and abuse. In terms of use, the Internet is certainly like a "commons" where people can
gather, find common interests and communicate. In fact the analogy of the "green space" has been applied to
new communication technologies such as cable. [140] Other commentators have discussed whether certain
elements of cyberspace are akin to a public forum under a traditional free speech analysis. [141] The concept
of a public forum in First Amendment jurisprudence is based upon the concept of protected speech, such as
those words spoken on the town "green space" of the Early-American colonial village.
{61} Yet, in terms of abuse, the space of the World Wide Web, for example, would certainly appear limitless
and guarded only by the confines of developing technology. For instance, there seems to be the potential for
millions of additional sites on the World Wide Web, which would represent millions of additional publishers
and users. On the other hand, commentators, such as Gladstone, [142] argue that viewing the Web as another
common marketspace, a "sprawling mall offering goods or services" or perhaps a "vast library," for example,
[143] is unsound. However, the argument could be made that the "commons" is nonetheless being degraded.
This might hold true for two reasons. The first consideration is degradation in terms of content and context.
While questionable speech, such as that which is harmful, like hate sites or bomb-making pages, obscene,
indecent, or otherwise offensive has a place on the Internet, it might still represent some lesser-valued
information for most users. [144]
{62} In American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of speech fall outside
of the protection of the First Amendment. [145] Implicit in this hierarchy of speech is an underlying
assessment that identifies some speech as less worthy of protection than other types. In Roth v. United States,
[146] the Supreme Court observed that, "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." [147] While this content has a right to exist,
should it dominate the make-up of the World Wide Web? [148] Likewise, could one ask whether the
Internet's value, in terms of context, as a medium of information transfer or an information resource is being
degraded due to the proliferation of personal sites on the Web?
{63} Additionally, in the print or analog marketplace, traditional editing mechanisms do operate as filters of
sorts on less desirable content, by naturally screening out material that editors and publishers believe will be
of little interest, in terms of potential marketability, to the public. The result is that the information
dissemination publishing system limits the amount of information available at any one time. [149] This
availability issue raises the concept of information overload or noise in the context of the Internet. [150]
{64} While it might empower a personal website owner to be able to create their own site, does it really
matter to individual X that individual Y who is on the other side of the country enjoys taking pictures of the
moon or is placing live images of their cat online? Does this add to the quality of life, does it detract from the
usefulness of the Internet as an information system? This line of reasoning recalls another theory in
information science which maintains that in any information system, a sizeable portion of the information
will be of lesser or mediocre quality. [151]
{65} As more and more information is available on the World Wide Web, locating and using information in
an effective manner becomes more and more difficult. This information overload might be likened to a
degradation of the "information commons" to the extent that a "commons" does exist in cyberspace.
{66} Finally, a complete reliance on this principle ignores the role of private spaces as well. When private
rights are awarded and the use of some property is limited or subject to ownership rights, there is also a
preservation of that space, in terms of overuse or in terms of the abuse of the rights of the space-holder. It is
true that in a technological sense, space is unlimited on the Internet and anyone can be a publisher. In the
analogy presented, an argument might be made that the world would never run out of the "Internet
Commons;" yet, there is a slow pollution of the quality of the information space from overload and from
offensive, dangerous, and erroneous content. Property rights can therefore serve a purpose, [152] as they
prevent the overuse of the "information commons," curtail information overload, and like the zoning laws of
modern real property law, carve out spaces for particular uses.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
{67} What are the challenges facing the legal infrastructure in the post-national era? The first challenge is to
reject harmonization when that process results in the domination of external forces upon the governance of an
individual state or multi-state entity. Likewise, should caution be extended to various globalization efforts
that attempt to place commercial interests above other interests of a state or its citizenry? In contrast, efforts
to incorporate or preserve the cultural or information integrity of the citizenry should be attempted.
{68} Sovereign states or multi-state entities will continue to respond through law to the challenges of the
digital environment. While the application of law to cyberspace is under development, there is the potential
that a loss of information access and equity will occur. This loss may result as when traditional information
boundaries breakdown (i.e., iteration) and new meta-information boundaries arise (i.e., redaction). There is
no longer a check vis-à-vis the legal infrastructure on the private stakeholders whose interests may be in
opposition to the public good. Furthermore, sovereign states or multi-state entities should resist the tendency
to adopt self-protection measures under a reaction approach that may restrict the flow and access of
information, and should also be weary of the marginalization of the public interest or of particular
stakeholders whose interests may not otherwise be protected.
{69} Finally, designers of the legal information infrastructure in the post-national era must be aware of
certain myths that may permeate the attitudes of various global information infrastructure ("GII")
stakeholders. The Internet may, at times, resemble a model that is unlike any other community (i.e.,
virtuality). The Internet may also exhibit the character of a "last frontier" or be akin to a "public commons" or
"green space." But, no one model, though contributing to an understanding of the Internet, can serve to
explain all of its nuances in all settings. Planning the future of the GII with an awareness of these concepts
and the potential negative effects that unreasonable reliance on any model one could produce will result in the
design of optimal social, political, economic, and legal infrastructures that are most beneficial to world
citizenry.
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